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Drivers of Success for Market Entry into China and India

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Joseph Johnson & Gerard J. Tellis Drivers of Success for Market Entry into China and India China and India are the fastest-growing major markets in the world and the most popular markets for foreign entrants. However, no study has examined the success or failure of these entries. Using a new definition of success and a uniquely compiled archival database, the authors analyze whether and why firms that entered China and India succeeded or failed. The most important findings are rather counterintive: Smaller firms are more successful than larger firms, and firms entering more open emerging markets have less success. Other findings are that success is greater with earlier entry, greater control of entry mode, and shorter cultural and economic distances between the home and the host countries. Importantly, with or without control for these drivers, firms have less success in India than in China. The authors discuss the reasons for and implications of these findings. Keywords: market entry, India, China, success factors hina and India have become major players in the world economy. For example, China and India have led all world economies with gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates of more than 9% in recent years (Vietor 2007). Because of this rapid growth, China and India are currently the third- and fifth-largest economies in purchasing power parity (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003). Some forecasts suggests that by 2020, China and India will pass Japan in GDP in purchasing power parity and that by 2050 China will be the leading economy of the world, followed by the United States and India (Hawksworth 2006). This remarkable economic resurgence and future promise of China and India have made entering these markets critical to the survival and success of many firms (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003). Of the Fortune 500, 400 firms now operate in China (Fishman 2005), and 220 of the top 500 firms operate in India (India Brand Equity Foundation 2005). In 2005, China alone attracted approximately $1 billion per week in foreign direct investment. Whereas firms in the earlier years rushed into these countries primarily for reasons such as acquiring resources, securing key supplies, accessing low-cost factors, and diversifying sources of supply (Vernon, Wells, and Rangan 1996), the rising income of the local populace is now resulting in market-seeking behavior. How have foreign entrants performed in these emerging markets? What drivers have led to their success or failure? Firms have been reluctant to divulge specific information on performance, and researchers have neglected to study this issue; thus, it has gone largely unexamined. As a result, C Joseph Johnson is Assistant Professor of Marketing, School of Business istration, University of Miami (e-mail: jjohnson@miami.edu). Gerard J. Tellis is Director of Center for Global Innovation, Neely Chair of American Enterprise, and Professor of Marketing, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles (e-mail: tellis@usc.edu). This article benefited by a grant from Don Murray to the USC Marshall Center for Global Innovation. despite almost three decades of history, it is unclear how firms should enter such emerging markets. Examples of unexplained success and failure abound. Unilever launched 14 joint ventures in China from 1986 to 1999 (Dasgupta and Dutta 2004) and was in the red for most of the time. On the contrary, Procter & Gamble (P&G) ended up as the market leader in almost all categories it introduced in China (Tunistra 2000). Although the few empirical studies on entry success (e.g., Gielens and Dekimpe 2007; Luo 1998; Pan, Li, and Tse 1999) have made important contributions to the topic, they suffer from at least one of the following limitations: First, the studies focus on a single country—China in most cases. Second, the studies use a restrictive definition of success, such as market share, which does not encapsulate degrees of success and failure. Third, the studies often focus on one particular industry. Fourth, the studies do not cover success or failure over time from the beginning of the liberalization of the Chinese and Indian economies. Against this setting, it is unclear whether these findings are generalizable across industries and emerging markets. The current study attempts to analyze the success and failure of firms entering the major emerging markets of China and India. It addresses the following research questions: What drives the success of entry into China and India? Is entry into China more or less successful than that into India? and How do entry mode, entry timing, and firm size (firm-level variables) and economic distance, cultural distance, country risk, and country openness (country-level variables) affect success? Our contributions to the literature are as follows: First, we propose a richer measure for success and failure, which encapsulates longitudinal historical accounts. Second, we relate our measure of success to underlying drivers that emerge from a vast body of interdisciplinary research over decades. Third, we focus on both the major emerging markets: China and India. Fourth, because of the paucity of systematic or syndicated data, we use the historical method (Golder and Tellis 1993) to collect data to answer these questions. 1 Journal of Marketing Vol. 72 (May 2008), 1–13 © 2008, American Marketing Association ISSN: 0022-2429 (print), 1547-7185 (electronic)

Drivers of Success for Market Entry into China and India

We organize the rest of the article into three sections. First, we discuss the drivers of success or failure and pose specific research questions. Second, we describe the method and results of historical analysis. Third, we discuss the findings, implications, and limitations of our study. The Drivers of Entry Success Researchers have not yet developed a single coherent theory of the drivers of success or failure of entry in emerging markets. This section reviews the prior literature on international market entry to identify the drivers of success or failure in market entry, proposes a conceptual framework for these drivers, and derives some questions for empirical research. The interdisciplinary literature spans marketing, strategy, and international business (Dunning 1988; Root and Ahmed 1979; Zhao, Luo, and Suh 2004). We use the terms “firm” to describe the entrant, “host country” to describe China or India, “home country” to describe the firm’s country of origin, and “foreign country” to describe any other country that may be involved. We suggest two broad constructs that drive firm performance in international entry: firm differentiation and country differentiation. Within firm differentiation, two key constructs are firm strategy and firm resources. The most important strategies in international entry are entry mode and entry timing. We measure firm resources with one key variable, firm size. Within country differentiation, the key construct is hostcountry characteristics. Among these characteristics, the two that we identify as important are country openness and country risk. In addition to these constructs, firm and country differentiation together shape host–home location. Two variables of this latter construct that are most extensively discussed in the literature are cultural distance and economic distance. We measure firm performance by the historical success of firms as reported in archival records. Figure 1 shows a conceptual framework of how the constructs are related to one another and which variables we use to measure these constructs. The subsequent subsections discuss the role of each of these independent variables in affecting historical success or failure. 2. License and franchise: a formal permission or right offered to a firm or agent located in a host country to use a home firm’s proprietary technology or other knowledge resources in return for payment. 3. Alliance: agreement and collaboration between a firm in the home market and a firm located in a host country to share activities in the host country. 4. Joint venture: shared ownership of an entity located in a host country by two partners, one located in the home country and the other located in the host country. 5. Wholly owned subsidiary: complete ownership of an entity located in a host country by a firm located in the home country to manufacture or perform value addition or sell goods/services in the host country. Entry Mode The mode of entry is a fundamental decision a firm makes when it enters a new market because the choice of entry automatically constrains the firm’s marketing and production strategy. The mode of entry also affects how a firm faces the challenges of entering a new country and deploying new skills to market its product successfully (Gillespie, Jeannet, and Hennessy 2007). A firm entering a foreign market faces an array of choices to serve the market. In an exhaustive survey of the different modes of market entry, Root (1994) identifies 15 different forms. Following Root, we categorize these into the following five main classes, listed in order of increasing control: 1. Export: a firm’s sales of goods/services produced in the home market and sold in the host country through an entity in the host country. A firm can choose any of these entry modes or some combination of them to enter a host country. The key attribute that distinguishes the different modes of entry is the degree to which they give a firm control over its key marketing resources (Anderson and Gatignon 1986). At one end of the spectrum is the export of goods, which has the lowest degree of control. Licenses, franchises, and various forms of joint venture provide a progressively increasing degree of control for the firm; at the other end of the spectrum, ownership-based entries, such as wholly owned subsidiaries, afford the highest control. Two opposing theories suggest alternative outcomes as control increases: the resource-based view and the transactions cost view. The resource-based view holds that as the degree of control increases, the firm’s chances of success increase because the firm can deploy key resources that are essential to success (Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Isobe, Makino, and Montgomery 2000). These resources can be intangible properties, such as brand equity and marketing knowledge (Arnold 2004), or tangible properties, such as a patent or a process blueprint. Control over such properties gives a firm the freedom to deploy resources flexibly, thus enhancing its chances of success. In the context of emerging markets, control provides two key benefits. First, it safeguards key resources from leakage, such as patent theft. Second, it allows for internal operational control, which is essential to a firm’s success in emerging markets (Luo 2001). In addition, a firm can control key complementary resources, such as access to local distribution channels, which can be important to its success in any country. The transaction cost view holds that costs increase with increasing control of the mode of entry. Control and commitment are inextricably linked in mode of entry (Luo 2001). High control in entry strategies entails high commitment. Transaction cost theory suggests that the higher the resource commitment and desired control of an entry mode, the higher is the cost. Wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures are high-cost entry modes because of the level of resource commitment needed to set up operations (Pan and Chi 1999). These higher costs imply that higher levels of investments are needed for the firm to break even and make a profit. Taken together, these arguments lead to our first specific research question: Q1: Does success in entering emerging markets increase or decrease with the degree of control? 2 / Journal of Marketing, May 2008

Drivers of Success for Market Entry into China and India

FIGURE 1 Conceptual Framework: Drivers of Entry Success Entry mode Firm strategy Entry timing Firm differentiation Firm resources Firm size Historical success Economic distance Host–home location Cultural distance Nonmeasured construct Country risk Measured variable Nonestimated measurement Openness Estimated relationship Hostcountry characteristics Firm performance Country differentiation Market Entry into China and India / 3

Drivers of Success for Market Entry into China and India

Entry Timing In addition to the entry mode, the role of market entry timing is critical in emerging markets (Pan and Chi 1999). However, the direction of the effect is not clear. The literature suggests reasons that early entry into international markets could favor or hurt success. On the one hand, early entry has many advantages. First, the early entrant can lock up access to key resources, such as distribution channels and suppliers. Second, early entrants have the opportunity to set the pattern of consumer preference (Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989; Mitchell 1999), which may disadvantage later entrants. Third, early entrants can benefit from being the first to exploit governmental concessions and incentives, which governments often offer to attract such entrants (Pan and Chi 1999). Fourth, early entrants can time their entry to exploit the “strategic window” of an expanding market and observe and learn market attributes for a longer period. Pan and Chi (1999, p. 360) report that “[multinational corporations] that started their production in China in an earlier year had a higher level of profit than those that began in a later year.” On the other hand, Golder and Tellis (1993) find that pioneers are often not the long-term winners in a market. Using U.S. data, they show that in several categories, “best” beats “first” (Tellis and Golder 2001). In the international context, pioneers may fail for several reasons. First, firms that rush in first may not be aware of the pitfalls of the newly opened emerging market. Second, returns to the early entrants might be too low compared with their investments, especially because infrastructure is not yet fully developed. Third, latter entrants have a flatter learning curve because they can learn from the early entrants’ errors (Fujikawa and Quelch 1998). These three factors may be responsible for the failure of many early entrants in some markets (Arnold 2004). These arguments lead to our second research question: Q2: Does success in entering emerging markets increase or decrease with early entry? marketing-specific knowledge than smaller firms. For example, Nestlé has a portfolio of 7695 brands to choose from and a huge organizational history of international expansion to help it exploit any new market that it enters (Parsons 1996). Third, larger firms are more capable of sustaining periods of negative performance on entry into a host country than smaller firms. Luo (1997) finds that size favors performance, even after controlling for mode of entry. Conversely, the experience of many large firms shows that size is no guarantee for success. The recent withdrawal of Wal-Mart first from Korea and then from Germany is a case in point (The Economist 2006). Researchers have unearthed some explanations for this result. Large size diminishes organizational flexibility because of increasing bureaucracy (Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson 2003). This bureaucratic effect also impairs innovative ability (Chandy and Tellis 2000). In line with this finding, Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1985) show that export success is negatively correlated with firm size in the high-tech electronics industry. These arguments lead to our third research question: Q3: Are smaller or larger firms more successful in entering merging markets? Economic Distance Economic distance is a measure of economic disparity between two countries. Firms find it easy to deal with host countries that are close in economic distance from their home country for several reasons. First, countries close in economic development have similar market segments that can afford to consume similar types of goods and services. Thus, knowledge about market demand transfers easily from home to host country. Second, countries close in economic development have similar physical infrastructure, such as airports, roadways, railways, and seaports. Thus, firms serving a host country with an infrastructure similar to the home country will enjoy efficiencies in its operations, thus lowering costs. Third, firms develop competencies or knowledge-based resources that are related to the markets they serve (Madhok 1997). These resources can be best leveraged in countries that are similar in economic development because the skills learned in one market can be replicated in or adapted to the new markets. Firms entering countries that are widely different economically from their home country need to adjust to the new market conditions, thus reducing their likelihood of success (Dunning 1998). These arguments suggest our fourth research question: Q4: Does entry success decrease with greater economic distance? Firm Size New trade theories developed by Krugman (1980) and Porter (1990) suggest that firm-specific advantages play an important role in international trade. Although small firms (with fewer than 500 employees) today account for 30% of U.S. exports (Cateora and Graham 2006), in general, larger U.S. firms have been more able to participate in global markets than smaller firms because of their financial and managerial resources (Terpstra, Sarathy, and Russow 2006). The literature is not unanimous about the role of size in the success of firms; some researchers assert that large size helps, whereas others assert that it hurts. There are several reasons larger firms might have greater success than smaller firms. First, larger firms have recourse to more resources or can commandeer more resources than smaller firms (Bonaccorsi 1992). For example, Coke was able to purchase the leading cola brand in India, Thums Up, to open its entry into India (Ramaswami and Namakumari 2004). Second, larger firms are more likely to possess a greater wealth of product-specific and Cultural Distance Consumers are not driven by economic considerations alone. The underlying cultural dimensions of a society affect its consumption pattern beyond what economic laws predict (De Mooij 2004). “Culture” is usually defined as shared values and meanings of the members of a society. It affects not only the underlying behavior of customers in a market but also the execution and implementation of marketing and management strategies (Kogut and Singh 1988). For exam- 4 / Journal of Marketing, May 2008

Drivers of Success for Market Entry into China and India

ple, cultural distance affects how well partners in a joint venture interact over the cultural divide. Thus, cultural distance has a direct impact on the effectiveness of the entry. Evidence of failures caused by insensitivity to cultural differences abounds. The much-discussed troubles of Euro Disney provide a classic example of how Disney executives failed to adjust for the cultural differences between the United States and Europe. Cultural differences affect several aspects of consumer behavior as well as a firm’s marketing mix. It affects not only the attribute levels of products (Leclerc, Schmitt, and Dube 1994) and the efficiency of the marketing programs (Tse, Vetinsky, and Wehrung 1988) but also how customers derive meanings about the brand or product. Mistakes arising from misunderstandings of brand names are legion. The tendency of firms to start their international marketing activities in countries similar to their own is another example of how culture influences market entry. Several studies have shown that the sequential path of internationalization is determined by cultural distance to enhance the chances of successful entry (Czinkota 1982). Firms usually begin internationalizing by entering countries that are culturally close to them. For example, Toyota began exporting by first selling to the Southeast Asian countries (Terpstra, Sarathy, and Russow 2006). In addition to geographic proximity, cultural similarities may also lead U.S. firms to trade with Canada, European countries to trade with one another, and Japanese firms to focus on Asia (Johansson 2006). Frankel and Rose (2002) show that linguistic similarity is a far more powerful determinant of the volume of trade between countries than economic factors, such as a common currency. Barkema, Bell, and Pennings (1996) also show that cultural barriers “punctuate” organizational learning, lowering firms’ longevity in countries with greater cultural distance. These arguments suggest our fifth research question: Q5: Does success into emerging markets decrease with greater cultural distance? faith by the international financial system on the country’s ability to meet its international debt obligations (e.g., Argentina in 2001). Whatever the source of the problem, a fall in the currency rate will lead to a fall in revenues and profits (Shapiro 1985). Differential inflationary pressures between the home and the host country could also pose a risk. Inflation directly affects the price–demand structure of a firm. It can also affect the firm indirectly through its adverse affects on exchange rates (Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta 1995; Frankel and Mussa 1980). Country risk can reduce entry success in emerging markets in two ways. First, it can cause firms to lose money suddenly, precipitating a financial crisis. Consider P&G in Russia. Its “optimistic projections of Russia were shattered on a single day in the summer of 1998” (Dyer, Dalzell, and Olegario 2004, p. 336). The sudden devaluation of the ruble on August 17, 1998, triggered a deep financial crisis as the annual projected dollar revenues shrank to half, far below P&G’s ability to service debts. A more serious problem was the uncertainty over how long the crisis would last. Second, high country risk and past experiences of risk can lead firms to underinvest or delay investments, resulting in lower success over time. Unilever was cautious and delayed entry into China, “especially in view of the past difficult experiences with the Soviet Union” (Jones 2005, p. 160), another high-risk country. These arguments suggest our sixth research question: Q6: Does success of entry into emerging markets decrease with country risk? Country Openness The term “openness” refers to the lack of regulatory and other obstacles to entry of foreign firms. Openness could either increase or decrease entry success. On the one hand, openness could increase success for three reasons. First, it stimulates demand by increasing the variety of products offered for sale in the market. Second, it increases competition on quality and thus improves the level of quality suppl. Third, as the economy opens up, competition increases efficiency and lowers prices, resulting in further increases in demand. Consider the Indian automotive industry. Until the early 1980s, the protected local market was dominated by two highly inefficient players—Hindustan Motors (HM) and Premier Auto Limited (PAL)—which offered just 2 basic car models, priced at approximately $20,000. The government allowed Suzuki to set up a joint venture in 1983. This increased the number of car models in the Indian market to 3, and the quality of all cars on the market, including those from HM and PAL, improved dramatically. In 1992, the remaining barriers for foreign firms were lifted. Since then, 30 car models have been sold in India. Prices in all segments have steadily declined by 8%– 10% a year, and the industry has tripled in size. The liberalization of the Indian telecommunications industry and the resultant boom in the sales of cell phones are other examples of how openness spurred growth in demand (Ramaswamy and Namakumari 2004). Evidence from China also shows that “growth acceleration has been associated with the opening of markets” (Naughton 2007, p. 7). Country Risk Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1995) define “country risk” as uncertainty about the environment, which has three sources: political, financial, and economic. Political risk is the risk that laws and regulations in the host country will be changed adversely against a foreign firm. These could be of a regulatory nature, such as the imposition of tariffs, or of a political nature, such as unrest caused by pressure groups (Spar 1997). At its severest, political risks may cause confiscation of assets without adequate compensation (Hawkins, Mintz, and Provissiero 1976). Financial and economic risks manifest in several ways. They could take the form of (1) recessions or market downturns, (2) currency crises, or (3) sudden bursts of inflation. Most of these factors arise from imbalances in the underlying economic fundamentals of the host country, such as a balance of payment crisis. Recessions result from business cycles inherent in any economy (Lucas 1987). The origins of currency crises could be a progressively deteriorating trade imbalance (e.g., India in the late 1980s) or a loss of Market Entry into China and India / 5

Drivers of Success for Market Entry into China and India

On the other hand, an open economy is a double-edged sword. Although openness makes entry easier for a target firm, it increases competition from other new foreign entrants. Increasing competition affects market success in several ways. First, even a small degree of competition is enough to lower prices significantly (Wallace 1998). Thus, competition keeps margins low, permitting only the most efficient to survive. Second, competition increases costs of purchases, the hiring of talent, and the marketing of products and services. Competitive pressures are a reason firm profitability has been shown to be lower for international markets than for domestic markets (Gestrin, Knight, and Rugman 2001). Third, competition causes firms to lose leadership if they make any strategic mistakes, such as targeting the wrong segment or pricing the product too high, both of which are common mistakes in entering emerging markets. Competitors are quick to pounce on any mistake and prevent firms from recovering lost ground. Thus, increasing openness increases competition and decreases success. These arguments suggest our seventh research question: Q7: Does success of entry into emerging markets increase or decrease with country openness. Summary The prior sections show how three firm-level variables (mode of entry, timing of entry, and size) and four countrylevel variables (economic distance, cultural distance, risk, and openness) can affect the success or failure of a firm that is entering an emerging market. Next, we try to answer these questions through a historical analysis of entry into China and India. Empirical Evidence We carry out a historical analysis of market entry in two of the largest emerging markets to answer the research questions. We consider only the entry of firms that were not already set up in the years immediately before 1978 for China and 1991 for India. Historical analysis involves carefully assembling, critically examining, and summarizing the records of the past (Golder and Tellis 1993). This method is well suited for our purpose because it is based on neutral observers and factual data recorded at the time the success or failure of a firm’s entry occurs. Historical analysis provides a powerful means of understanding marketing phenomena by recreating markets as they evolved (Golder 2000). It also responds to the call for historical research in this area (e.g., Jones and Khanna 2006). In particular, Mitra and Golder (2002, p. 382) recommend “longitudinal, archival-based studies of relative success of companies in multiple markets.” This section presents the measures, procedure, sampling, and model of the empirics. Dependent variable: success (or failure). Perhaps the most contentious issue in studying success and failure of international market entry is to define and measure it. This is so because firms do not divulge the internal parameters and measurements of success. Attempts to ascertain this by the survey method lead to the well-known self-reporting bias (Golder and Tellis 1993). In addition, success is a timedependent phenomena, and at any given time, it may only be partial (Luo 1998). To circumvent this problem, researchers have used multiple measures of success, such as market share and profitability (Pan, Li, and Tse 1995), hazard rates (Li 1995), and timing (Luo 1998). To arrive at an objective and comprehensive measure that can discriminate degrees of success, we used a content analysis of articles from several sources reporting on the performance of firms entering into China and India, and we derived numerical ratings. For the content analysis, we first developed a set of terms that reviewers use to describe success or failure of market entry. We then grouped these terms into five levels of increasing success, assessed on a fivepoint scale (see Appendix A). This graded measure of success enables us to measure degrees of success. Entry mode. Anderson and Gatignon (1986) show how entry strategies can be categorized on the basis of the degree to which they allow a firm to control its entry into foreign markets. They categorize entry strategies as possessing low, medium, and high control over the firm’s strategy. To calibrate the varying degrees of control, we used a six-point ordinal scale ranging from 1 (“low-control entry mode”) to 5 (“high-control entry mode”), as follows: exports (1), alliances (2), franchise (3), joint ventures (4), equity joint ventures (4.5), and wholly owned subsidiaries (5). Mixed entry modes, such as contract manufacturing, can be understood as a hybrid of existing modes. Idiosyncratic variations of the traditional entry modes, such as wet or dry licenses (see Luo 2000, p. 284), can also be defined within the scope of our scale. Firms with two entry modes for different products are considered two separate entries. Timing. Our measure of timing is the number of years between a firm’s market entry and the year of first deregulation by the host country. For China, we took 1978 as the first year of deregulation, and for India, we took 1991. Firm size. To measure size of the firm, we used the yearend sales of the firm in the year of entry into the host country. Economic distance. To measure economic distance, we followed the work of Mitra and Golder (2002). Thus: (1) ˆ ˆ EDsmt = |GNPst − GNPmt | + |GNPst − GNPmt | + |Infra st − Infra mt | + |Popdensityst − Popdensity mt |, Measures This subsection discusses the measures for the dependent variable and the seven independent variables: entry mode, entry timing, firm size, economic distance, cultural distance, and openness. where EDsmt is the economic distance between the host country s and the home country m in year t; GNPst, mt and GNPst, mt are the log of aggregate and per capita gross national product (GNP) for host country s and home country m, respectively, in year t; Infrast, mt are the kilometers of road per square kilometer for host country s and home country m, respectively, in year t; and Popdensityst, mt are 6 / Journal of Marketing, May 2008

Drivers of Success for Market Entry into China and India

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